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COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE ON PARTICIPATION OFFENSES:
JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE, AIDING, AND ABETTING

Some people are concerned that pursuing peace ... and
prosecuting war criminals are incompatible goals. But I
believe they are wrong. There must be peace for justice to
prevail, but there must be justice when peace prevails.
— William Jefferson Clinton1

INTRODUCTION

I.

This paper will examine the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the federal
jurisdictions in Canada and the USA, England, Scotland, South Africa, Australia and New
Zealand regarding the crimes of “aiding and abetting” and “joint criminal enterprise,” or the
functional equivalent of the latter where the term is not used.2 A brief summary of the most
significant findings is provided, below. The detailed examination will commence in Part II
with a definition of critical terms, laying the groundwork for the analysis of varying
approaches used to combat crimes of this nature within the various jurisdictions. Part III will
proceed to a discussion of how the various jurisdictions distinguish the elements of these
crimes, and the weight given each element by that jurisdiction.
Summary of Findings
¾

The doctrine of “joint criminal enterprise” used by the International Tribunals

1
2

Forty-second President of the United States, 1993 – 2001
Research Topic 8. “Undertake a comparative study of jurisprudence in the ICTR and the ICTY, the
federal jurisdictions in Canada and the USA, England, Scotland, South Africa, France and Belgium,
of the legal concepts of : (a) Aiding (Article 6(1) of the ICTR Rules); (b) Abetting (Article 6(1) of
the ICTR Rules); (c) Joint Criminal Enterprise.” France and Belgium have been omitted, because of
inadequacy in the French language; Australia and New Zealand have been added to provide as
comprehensive a view of common law systems as is practicable in a memorandum
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is most similar to the South African doctrine of “common purpose.”
o Under the South African common purpose doctrine, the accused may be held fully culpable
for the actions of another, even where those actions fall outside the stated common purpose.
o The doctrine holds that the foreseeability of the cohort’s action is enough to impute his
conduct to his fellows. Moreover, the required foresight is inferred from the act of entering
into the common purpose with the other (i.e., a broad subjective standard).
o The accused may not be convicted of a crime that he could not have committed as a
principal (i.e., “through the instrumentality of his own body”).
o In South Africa, where a person enters into a common purpose already underway, he may
not be held culpable for a fatal blow that was struck prior to his entry into the action (on the
theory that the person’s joining in does not cause a fatality that precedes the joining).
¾

The British doctrine of joint enterprise and common purpose (reflected in the
jurisprudence of England, Australia, and New Zealand) differs from that of the Tribunals
and South Africa.

o For a person to be held culpable for the actions of another, those actions must have been
done in order to effect the common purpose (i.e., the agreed-upon purpose).
o The defendant must be shown to have contemplated and agreed to, or at least have had
knowledge of, the actions for which he is held culpable (i.e., a narrower subjective standard
than that of S. Africa).
¾

United States laws on conspiracy are similar to the British laws on common
purpose, with the following distinctions:

o Actions taken by a conspirator that fall outside the conspiracy may impute culpability to the
co-conspirators, if the actions are within what might have been foreseen as part of the
conspiracy.
o Under U.S. conspiracy law, the accused may be convicted without any culpable act beyond

2

the planning and agreement that constitute the conspiracy.
¾

The Scottish system uses “art and part” guilt to cover the same ground, with some
important differences.

o As in common law accessoryship, a person may be guilty “art and part” for actions
supporting a criminal act where the principal actor is unaware of the person’s involvement
in the crime.
o

A person may be guilty “art and part” for a crime that the person could not have committed
as a principal.

o Where a joiner to a crime enters into participation after a fatal blow has already been
struck, he may be held more culpable than the one who struck the blow (on the theory that
his joining an action, knowing it to be fatally violent, may reflect a more depraved nature
than an unpremeditated act of violence by the principal.)
¾

The common law crime of “aiding and abetting” 3 is equivalent to that of the principal actor in
the underlying crime, but as a “principal in the second degree.”

o In South Africa, an accused who does not fully satisfy the requirements for liability under the
common purpose doctrine will be charged as an accomplice, a term that applies to an
“accessory” or an “aider and abettor.” An accomplice must have acted intentionally.
o In the U.S., an accused may be liable as an aider and abettor if the outcome was known or
foreseen, as well as instances where the outcome was desired or intended. This is also true in
England, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
o In Scotland, since passage of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987, aiding and abetting
(as well as counseling, procuring and inciting) are incorporated into the doctrine of “art and
part” guilt.
¾

Under the common law, a person cannot be both an accessory and the
3

“To assist or facilitate the commission of a crime, or to promote its accomplishment.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, SECOND POCKET EDITION (West Publishing Group, 1996)

3

principal in a crime; this has led to procedural issues where the exact degree of
involvement is unknown. Many common law jurisdictions have enacted statutes to
overcome this, and other, anomalies in common law.
o In Britain, and the Australian states of New South Wales and Victoria the doctrine of
complicity survives in an essentially common law form.
o In the Autralian Criminal Code States of Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania, and
in New Zealand, the common law has been formally displaced by a codified doctrine of
criminal parties.
o In the United States, the Supreme Court has held there are no longer common law crimes,
but many states’ criminal law is based on the common law, rather than the Model Penal
Code.
o Accessories after the fact are not included in the category of aiders and abettors (this is true
in all the jurisdictions considered).

4

NATURE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS USED IN THIS COMPARISON

II.
A.

THE MEANING OF COMMON LAW
The legal systems examined in this report are common law systems, either in whole

or in part. In a common law system, case law – court decisions of individual cases – is a
source of law. A case decision is considered a precedent that has a prescriptive legal effect
and contains a rule of law as valid as enacted law. This is true even where courts interpret
law enacted through legislation.
The term “common law” is somewhat confusing in that it has two meanings. In the
widest sense, the term is applied to all judicial decisions in a system where those decisions
have precedential effect. Within a common law system, however, the term is used in a
more narrow sense to mean that body of law developed and articulated solely through
judicial decisions that began in England in the 12th century. Unlike case law that interprets
statutes, common law in the latter sense constitutes a separate and distinct source of law,
apart from enacted law. In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that there can no
longer be common law crimes, except where there is a statutory crime that defines the
offense by reference to common law. In jurisdictions that still recognize the uncodified
common law, it is always on a lower level than enacted law. A legislature has the power to
abolish or modify the old common law as it sees fit.
The most notable feature of common law systems is the jury.4 For all the systems
considered here, the jury is usually the finder of fact in criminal trials. The need for
presenting evidence in a manner understandable to a jury of laymen has influenced the
4 In the mixed legal system of Scotland, juries are used only in criminal trials, where a verdict will be
returned by a simple majority (other jury systems require a unanimous verdict). The jurisdiction of
England and Wales is contemplating elimination of the civil trial jury. The United States uses juries
for criminal cases, except where the defense requests a “bench trial”, i.e., before a judge. In civil
cases in the U.S., jury trials are available and commonly requested.
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framework used to analyze elements of a criminal act in common law systems. A brief
survey of that framework of analysis may prove useful.
ELEMENTS OF A CRIMINAL ACT UNDER THE COMMON LAW

B.

Criminal law systems seek to apportion blame and responsibility in accordance with
the moral norms of a society, subject to the practical restraints of any functioning system.
A society’s criminal law, whether codified or not, is the primary institution serving this
function. Fault and wrongdoing along with intention and actual harm each play a role in
determining liability throughout the law. Within the jurisdictions considered here, the
elements of a crime are generally held to be four in number: 1) a voluntary act (“actus
reus”); 2) a culpable intent (“mens rea”); 3) concurrence between the act and the intent;
and 4) causation of harm.5 Each of these elements must be present for a crime to have
occurred, but each element is subject to a range of interpretations.
The Culpable Act: “Actus Reus”
For a crime to occur the defendant must commit a voluntary action. An involuntary act,
such as a reflex or a convulsion, imposes no criminal liability.6 Neither is omission to act
generally considered a crime in common law systems. An exception to this general rule would
arise where the defendant has a special relationship with the victim so that a legal duty was owed
to that person. Also, in cases of command responsibility omission could be criminal where a
defendant failed to act so as to stop subordinates from committing crimes, or failed to punish
subordinates for committing crimes.
A distinction is often drawn between forbidden acts that are immutably bad (mala in se)

5

See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE MODEL PENAL CODE OFFICIAL DRAFT (1962), Article 2.01 at 1137,
reproduced at tab 72.
6 Id.
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and those that simply violate statutory rules (mala prohibita). We could summarize the
difference by saying that mala in se crimes are those recognized as wrong by the common law,
and mala prohibita crimes are those made criminal by statute. However, not all mala in se
crimes are included in the subject matter of criminal law, and where a violation of the criminal
law has taken place, there is no formal difference between one criminal act or another based on
the distinction. Consequently, for purposes of legal analysis the old categories are of limited
use. In order to assign the blame-worthiness of an action, the analysis must consider all
relevant factors concerning the act, along with the other elements of the crime.
Culpable Intent: “Mens Rea”
The term “mens rea” is often translated as “state of mind,” meaning a culpable
mental state. However, negligence and recklessness can also be held criminal depending
on the circumstances. A mens rea must be proved for each element of the criminal act7 in a
common law criminal system.
Many common law countries draw a distinction between crimes of “general intent”
and those of “specific intent.” A crime of general intent is one for which it must simply be
shown that the defendant desired to commit the specific actus reus of the crime.8 A crime
of specific intent requires that the defendant desired to commit a specific act with some

7 Except for crimes that impose strict liability, in which case merely proving the defendant did the act
is sufficient for conviction. Such crimes include sexual relations with a minor, concealing dangerous
weapons on airplanes, and (in the U.S.) mislabeling of drugs, and dangerous pollution of air or
water. Since the crimes under consideration in this comparative study all require a culpable state of
mind, no further analysis is given for strict liability. (See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277
S.Ct. 134 (1943) (where the president and manager of a drug company was held criminally liable for
mislabeling of pharmaceutical drugs, although the error took place without his knowledge),
reproduced at tab 54.) Note that another exception in U.S. law to the need for proving mens rea for
each element of the crime is the doctrine of “felony murder,” discussed infra in Part III.
8
An example would be “battery,” where the desire of the perpetrator is to inflict bodily harm on the
victim. Since the definition of the crime is “intentional infliction of bodily harm,” proving the
defendant had that desire would be sufficient mens rea for conviction.
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concomitant objective.9 Modern penal codes have generally dispensed with the
general/specific distinction, replacing the terms with descriptions of the precise mental
states required for each element of the crime in question. However, where common law
principles are controlling, the old designations may be referenced in the opinion. The
salient point is that where crimes of specific intent are charged, the requisite mens rea must
be proved for each act constituting the crime.
The classifications of mens rea used in assigning criminal blame in the common
law are, in descending order of culpability: (a) purposeful, (b) knowing, (c) reckless, and
(d) negligent.10 A clear understanding of the precise differences among these terms is
essential to understanding how the various jurisdictions define criminal acts under the
common law. Consequently, a general description for the meaning of these terms is
provided to form a baseline for discussion.
A person acts purposely where it is his conscious objective to engage in the conduct
in question so as to bring about the result in question. This is often confused with the
similar but not identical mental state of “intentionally.” A purposeful action includes a
level of knowledge and desire that may be missing from an intentional action. If a crime is
defined so as to require that a person act “purposely,” then the defendant must be shown to
have consciously desired the consequences of the action.
The primary distinction between “knowingly” and “purposely” committing an act
9

10

For example, to convict a person of common law burglary one must show that the perpetrator
intended to break into another person’s home and that the perpetrator intended to commit a felony
(stealing) once inside the home. The second act is the specific intent that raises the crime to
burglary, as opposed to mere breaking and entering. The significance of the distinction between
crimes of general versus specific intent comes into focus where the defendant raises some mitigating
factor as a defense – such as that he was intoxicated, or that (in the case of burglary) he broke into a
house to reclaim something that belonged to him.
See Note 7., supra.
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has to do with awareness of the outcome. If a crime is defined so that the defendant must
“knowingly” have committed the deed, then the defendant must have been practically
certain that his conduct would cause the result; it need not be shown that the defendant had
an objective to bring about the result. Scottish law conflates “purposely” and “knowingly”
into a single term “intentionally,” which is further analyzed to define how knowledge and
desire play into that concept.11 Consequently, there is no general rule in Scotland that
requires a criminal prosecution to prove the defendant desired to bring about the specific
outcome for which he is charged. South Africa also blurs these distinctions, considering
purpose and foresight to be categories of intention. South Africa traditionally relied upon a
presumption that persons intend the “natural and probable consequences” of their actions.
However, since 1945 this presumption has been replaced by the concept of dolus
eventualis.12 Like the presumption, the concept relies upon the consequences of the act,
holding that persons can be said to have intended the consequences that flow from their
actions. The distinction is that under dolus eventualis, the person is not presumed to have
intended the consequences.13 Rather, it requires as a matter of fact that the person should
have realized the consequences would occur.
In all the common law jurisdictions under discussion, where a defendant is held
responsible for a harmful outcome that he did not consciously desire, and did not know the
outcome to a great enough certainty that he acted “knowingly,” then the criminal mens rea
is likely to be “reckless.”
A person acts “recklessly” where he “consciously disregards a substantial and
11
12

13

GERALD GORDON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 147 (2000), reproduced at tab 4.
JONATHAN BURCHELL & JOHN MILTON, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 399 (1997), reproduced at
tab 3.
See State v. Gqabi, [1999] SA 459/97, reproduced at tab 38.
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unjustifiable risk”14 so that his behavior constitutes or will bring about the criminal act.
The conduct must be so at variance with societal norms that it is raised to the level of
serious crime. The risk in question “must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s
failure to perceive it … involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”15 Most jurisdictions require that
application of the term “reckless” is appropriate only where the defendant was aware of the
risk involved in his action. If a person engages in dangerously risky behavior, but can
show that he was not aware of the extent of the risk, he is said to have acted “negligently.”
Common law rulings and many statutes make it a crime to behave “negligently”
where certain results follow. For example, the U.S. crime of vehicular homicide is often
defined to require the mens rea of “criminal negligence.” Criminal negligence differs from
civil negligence only in degree. If we define civil negligence as behavior that deviates
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation,
then criminal negligence is a “gross deviation” from that standard.16
Concurrence between Act and Intent
There must be concurrence involving the mens rea in two ways. First, there must
be concurrence between the requisite state of mind and the culpable act. Second, there
must be concurrence between the mens rea and the harmful outcome where crimes are
defined in terms of bad results.
In respect to the mens rea and the actus reus, there must be a concurrence in time.
The mental state required for the crime must have been present at the time the act was

14
15
16

at Section 2.02 (2) (c).
Id.
Id. at (d)
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committed. Moreover, the mental state must have been the cause of the culpable act. The
second required concurrence means that where the crime is defined in terms of outcome,
then the requisite mental state must apply to the actual result. Where the result is far
removed from what was intended, there is no concurrence between the mens rea and the
result, and consequently no criminal liability for the outcome. If the outcome is a different
type of crime than the one intended, then the defendant will generally not be guilty of that
crime if it is one requiring a purposive mens rea. Neither could he be charged with the
crime he intended, despite his state of mind, where the result is too far removed from the
intent.17
Causation of Harm
Criminal causation refers to the link between the unlawful act and the resulting
harmful outcome. In common law jurisdictions, the act must cause the outcome in two
different senses. First, the act must be the cause in fact of the result. Second, the act must
be the proximate cause, or legal cause, of the result.
An act can be called the cause in fact of a result in one of two ways. If the result
would not have come about “but for” the act, then the act is the cause in fact. Alternatively,
if the act is a substantial factor in bringing about the resulting harm, the act can be called
the cause in fact. These two factors often overlap, but are sometimes distinguished in
judicial opinions.
The definition of proximate cause incorporates concepts of both time and space.
The requirement is that the act and the result be so closely related that the actor can be held

17

An exception to this rule is the common law crime of felony-murder. Felony-murder is not included
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criminally liable for the result. Respecting the time factor, there is an old common law rule
called the “year and a day” rule, which says the defendant cannot be convicted for the
results of his act if the result does not occur within one year plus one day after the act.
Wherever the common law has not been replaced by enacted statutes providing otherwise,
this rule still applies.
C.

ELEMENTS OF ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY IN COMMON LAW
Under the common law, accessorial liability is derivative in nature, assigning

culpability for an underlying crime perpetrated by another, the principal. The accessory
must instigate, encourage or assist the principal to commit the subject crime. In order to
become liable as an accessory, the defendant need not be in concert with the principal,
though usually he will be. The accessory may play a dominant, co-equal or subsidiary role
in the commission of the crime. That is, he may move the principal to commit the crime,
he may participate in the crime with the principal as an equal, or he may perform a purely
subordinate act of support on behalf of the principal who has determined to commit the
crime in any case. The accessory need not share the criminal purpose, or intention of the
principal. Generally, it is sufficient that the accessory performs an act of support in the
knowledge of the principal’s criminal purpose, whether or not he shares in the purpose.
Accessoryship is not an offense in itself. The doctrine of accessoryship merely
represents participation in a crime, whereby the person who instigates, encourages or
assists the perpetrator to commit a crime becomes liable for the act as if he were himself a
perpetrator. In complicity, there is only one offence, though there may be multiple
offenders. If the crime in question is never attempted, then no culpability exists for any of
the possible participants. Moreover, a defendant cannot be convicted of complicity where
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no perpetrator has been identified, at least as to existence and culpability if not by name.
Under the old common law, the accessory could not be convicted unless the principal had
already been convicted. Another tenant of the common law is that the participant cannot be
held more guilty than the principal. Accessories after the fact are universally held to be of
lesser culpability than other participants in criminal acts.18
As is evident from even this cursory examination, there is room for wide variance in
using these elements as an analytical framework. Ambiguities and inconsistencies have
contributed to the emergence of model codes in several common law systems. Despite a
general trend toward enacting legislation to replace the old common law, in South Africa,
England and Scotland the criminal law remains uncodified. Part III of this report examines
how the specific jurisdictions under comparison utilize both enacted statutes and the
traditional framework of analysis in respect to these participation crimes.

COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE ON COMPLICITY CRIMES

III.

Where an individual is held blameworthy for actions committed with or by another,
there is need for extra care in framing the analytical elements used to assess blame for that
individual’s conduct. The culpability of perpetrators, and participants, must be carefully
weighed against the seriousness of the outcome and the rights of the victim for justice within
the system.
JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE

A.

Joint criminal enterprise means group criminality. England uses the term “joint

18

See David Watt, Accessoryship after the Fact: Substantive, Procedural and Evidentiary
Considerations, Criminal Reports, 3rd Series (2002), reproduced at tab 60.
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enterprise” in both criminal and civil law.19 The concept of a joint criminal enterprise is
not clearly delineated in every jurisdiction examined here. The doctrine is very close to the
South African “common purpose”20 and is largely contained in the Scottish term of “art and
part.”21 For group criminality the term “common purpose” is also employed in England,
which has a higher mens rea22 for the crime than does South Africa. The jurisdictions of
Australia and New Zealand also use the term “common purpose,” and (more or less)
conform to the English model.23 In Canada,24 and in the United States, the legal concepts
contained in joint criminal enterprise are distributed across the crimes of accessory and
conspiracy – or the accused is charged as a co-perpetrator with no additional designation.25
A closer examination of each jurisdiction’s jurisprudence for this category of crime
follows.
In a judgment handed down by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY)26, the judges held that crimes against humanity at the Omarska Camp constituted a
joint criminal enterprise for which all the defendant participants were guilty. The concept
of joint criminal enterprise is held to be implicit in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.27 This
was held to be true because the defendants had committed their crimes during a “hellish
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orgy of persecution”28 where the crimes could not be isolated. Consequently, the theory of
“common purpose or joint criminal enterprise” was employed.
The amended indictment had charged the accused with seventeen counts of crimes
against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war. Charges included
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds by means of murder; torture and
beating; sexual assault and rape; harassment, humiliation and psychological abuse; and
confinement in inhumane conditions. Zigic was the only accused in this case to be charged
with crimes in locations other than the Omarska camp (i.e., Keraterm and Trnopolje
camps). The indictment charged Zigic with individual responsibility under Article 7(1) of
the ICTY Statute.29 The others accused were charged with individual and superior
responsibility under Articles 7(1) and 7(3).30 The Trial Chamber concluded that the
evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the Omarska camp functioned as a joint
criminal enterprise, and found the accused guilty of persecution as a crime against
humanity. Zigic was also found guilty of murder, torture and cruel treatment as violations
of the laws or customs of war under Article 7(1). The court sentenced the accused to prison
terms ranging between five and twenty-five years.
The Trial Chamber elaborated extensively on the theories of criminal responsibility
involved in the doctrine of "joint criminal enterprise." The Chamber restated the three
elements that require proof in order for joint criminal enterprise liability to arise: (1) a
plurality of persons; (2) the existence of a common plan which amounts to or involves the
commission of a crime provided for in the Statute; and (3) participation of the accused in
28
29
30

Supra Note 26, at ¶ 324.
Supra Note 27.
Id.
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the execution of the common plan. Given the facts of the case, the court limited the scope
of its analysis to one particular circumstance of joint criminal enterprise liability, namely
where the accused have personal knowledge of a system of ill-treatment and demonstrate
an intent to further or otherwise participate in the system of abuse.
In assessing the necessary mens rea for different modes of participation in a joint
criminal enterprise (co-perpetration and aiding or abetting), the Trial Chamber examined
relevant post World War II "concentration camp" cases. They then issued the opinion that
"a co-perpetrator of a joint criminal enterprise shares the intent to carry out the joint
criminal enterprise and performs an act or omission in furtherance of the enterprise; an
aider or abettor of the joint criminal enterprise need only be aware that his or her
contribution is assisting or facilitating a crime committed by the joint criminal enterprise."
Next, the Trial Chamber examined what level of participation is required for lower
level persons to be criminally liable under the joint criminal enterprise theory, especially
those who did not order or organize the camps, nor orchestrate their operations. Again, the
court analyzed relevant post World War II jurisprudence and concluded that it shows that
"when a detention facility is operated in a manner which makes the discriminatory and
persecutory intent of the operation patently clear, anyone who knowingly participates in
any significant way in the operation of the facility or assists or facilitates its activity, incurs
individual criminal responsibility for participation in the criminal enterprise, either as a coperpetrator or an aider and abettor, depending upon his position in the organizational
hierarchy and the degree of his participation." The person's acts or omissions must
significantly assist or facilitate the commission of the crimes, which means that the act or
omission "makes an enterprise efficient or effective; e.g., a participation that enables the

16

system to run more smoothly or without disruption." This level of participation must be
determined on a case by case basis and depends on various factors. Moreover, crimes that
are committed to further the joint criminal enterprise and that are natural and foreseeable
consequences of the enterprise can also be attributed to a person (aider, abettor, and coperpetrator) who knowingly participates in the enterprise in any significant way.
With respect to Kvocka, a Serb police officer, the court found that he served in the
Omarska camp in a position that the court found to be the functional equivalent of a deputy
commander with some degree of authority over the guards. According to the evidence, he
had extensive knowledge of the camp's abusive practices and conditions, but did little to
prevent or ease them. He was also aware of serious crimes being committed in the camp
and sometimes witnessed them. Nevertheless, Kvocka performed his duties in the camp for
at least seventeen days in a skillful and efficient manner, without complaint. As deputy of
the camp commander, he made a significant contribution to the camp's administration and
functioning. Finally, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Kvocka was aware of
the persecution and ethnic violence prevalent in the camp and he knew that his work in the
camp facilitated the commission of crimes.31 Based on the above findings, the Trial
Chamber concluded that Kvocka was a co-perpetrator of the joint criminal enterprise that
was the Omarska camp. The Trial Chamber convicted Kvocka under Article 7(1) of the
Statute for persecution as a crime against humanity and for murder and torture as violations
of the laws or customs of war. He received a sentence of seven years' imprisonment.
The court followed similar reasoning for Prcac, a pensioner who was mobilized in
April 1992 and worked for about twenty-two days as an administrative aid of the Omarska
31

at ¶ 413.
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camp commander, and Kos, a guard shift leader who was involved in beatings and
extortion of detainees. The court found both guilty under Article 7(1) as co-perpetrators in
a joint criminal enterprise and convicted them of persecution as a crime against humanity,
as well as murder and torture as violations of the laws or customs of war. Prcac received a
prison sentence of five years, while Kos received six years.
Radic was also a guard shift leader and worked during the entire three months that
the Omarska camp was in operation. He exerted substantial authority over certain guards
and his shift was notorious for the camp's most brutal cases of physical and mental abuse or
mistreatment. Radic knew of these crimes and their discriminatory purpose. The Trial
Chamber found that he failed to use his authority to stop the crimes committed by the
guards in his shift, and that his failure to do so in fact encouraged the guards to continue.
Moreover, Radic seemed to condone their actions. In addition, Radic personally committed
or threatened to commit the crime of rape and other forms of sexual violence against nonSerb women. The court qualified his contribution to the camp's maintenance and
functioning as substantial, concluding that he "willingly and intentionally contributed to the
furtherance of the joint criminal enterprise."32 Radic was found guilty, under Article 7(1),
as a co-perpetrator of persecution, murder and torture including rape and other forms of
sexual violence, all of which were committed as part of the joint criminal enterprise
operative in the Omarska camp. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison.
Lastly, the court considered Zigic, a taxi driver who frequented the Omarska camp
for the purpose of abusing detainees. The Trial Chamber found that Zigic personally and
directly committed crimes and that his participation in the joint criminal enterprise was
32
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significant. Moreover, he knew of the persecutory character of the crimes. This made him
a co-perpetrator in the joint criminal enterprise at Omarska. In relation to the Omarska
atrocities, Zigic was found guilty of persecution, murder, and torture. Zigic was also
convicted of crimes committed in the Keraterm and Trnopolje camps, namely persecution
as a crime against humanity, as well as murder, torture, and cruel treatment as violations of
the laws or customs of war. The court sentenced Zigic to twenty-five years' imprisonment.
The Trial Chamber stated that the verdicts and sentences imposed were issued
despite the fact that they were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the atrocities
at Omarska were an agreed upon objective among the members of the joint criminal
enterprise. They went on to say, “However, there is no doubt that these crimes were
natural and foreseeable consequences of the ethnic cleansing campaign. Furthermore,
[those involved] must have been aware that…these crimes would be inevitable [under the
circumstances at the camp].”33
England makes use of the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, generally requiring a
mens rea of knowledge or foresight regarding outcome of group activity. In one case, a
secondary party in a joint enterprise murder was held culpable where he recognized that the
outcome “might” result in homicide.34 In another case, a defendant was convicted of
murder for a joint criminal enterprise where he took no part in the violence, but did rob the
victim and did not summon help, or attempt to stop the crime.35 Another recent case
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suggests that the requisite mens rea for joint criminal enterprise may be shifting in England
from a required mens rea of knowledge to the less stringent standard of foresight.36
Doctrine of Common Purpose
In jurisdictions that do not use the term “joint criminal enterprise,” the concept is
frequently contained within the doctrine of “common purpose.” According to this doctrine,
a person becomes an accessory for any crime committed by another person in
circumstances where the two of them are concurrently party to a conspiracy for the
commission of the crime in question. Normally, there will be no dispute as to their liability
for the intended crime, both clearly being liable for it in one or another of the degrees of
complicity. Questions arise where other criminal acts are committed incidental to the crime
intended.
Australia uses both joint enterprise and common purpose37 to categorize instances
of group criminality. The issue of joint enterprise is held to be a matter of fact, not of legal
definition.38 The requisite mens rea is that the accused have at least contemplated the
possibility of the criminal outcome for culpability to attach.39
As applied in the jurisdictions of England, Australia, New Zealand, the doctrine
does not really represent a substantive addition to the general principles of complicity. The
accessory must have the mens rea appropriate to the crime. Clearly, the person who agrees
with another to commit a crime X, and who further agrees with the other (expressly or
tacitly) for commission of crime Y incidentally to committing X, encourages the
commission of the further crime. The doctrine of common purpose allows the person who
36
37
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participates in these crimes to be held culpable without the need to show the existence of a
prior conspiracy to commit the crimes. If he encourages or assists the other in committing
crime X, knowing that the other will also commit crime Y should this be necessary for the
purpose, then he will become accessory to Y also. Thus, the doctrine is in full conformity
with general principles of accessorial liability.
There are two basic features of the doctrine of common purpose as used in England,
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. First, the accessory’s liability is to be evaluated
on a subjective basis. The defendant must be shown to have contemplated at the beginning
of or during the currency of the common purpose that his confederate was prepared to
commit (or capable of committing) the incidental crime if necessary to bring about the
common purpose. Second, the probability of the confederate’s committing the incidental
crime is not relevant to culpability. The defendant need not have foreseen that the
incidental crime would be “likely” or “probable” while agreeing to commit the foundation
crime.40 These features are also in conformity with accessorial liability, since under the
common law it is enough that a person contemplated the possibility of another crime
without any prescribed test of eventuality.
South Africa uses common purpose more strictly than in the Commonwealth
countries. A defendant can be convicted for murder under the doctrine where neither
knowledge nor foresight can be established. It is enough to have known something that
raised the possibility of a criminal act on the part of a companion.41 In South African law,
the doctrine of common purpose applies most frequently to cases of murder, but can also
40
41
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apply to a number of other offences.42 In crimes of common purpose, the participants share
the knowledge of what each participant is capable of and/or likely to do in situations that
may arise. For instance, where the act of the person who kills a victim falls outside the
common purpose (which might have been to merely assault or rob him), the members of
the group who assist in the attack are aware that the cohort committing the killing is likely
to commit such an act. This principle is of great importance in cases where a number of
persons acting together commit criminal offences, where during a crime (such as robbery)
one of the participants kills the victim. The common intention or knowledge may thus take
the form of dolus eventualis – that is, foresight of the possibility of death coupled with
reconciliation to such a possibility.43
In the case of crimes such as murder that involve the causing of a certain result, not
only the conduct is imputed, but also the causing of the result – in the above example, the
causing of the victim’s death. Where a group of people act together with a common purpose
to kill, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove the existence of an antecedent
agreement or conspiracy to commit the offence. South African Courts recognize that the
common purpose may arise impulsively during execution of another crime. In Safatsa,44 the
Appellate Division stressed that the imputation of the act of one member of the group to
other members is based upon the “active association” of the other members in the execution
of the common purpose. Active association may take the form of conduct by the accused
that indicates he sided with the person committing the offence. It involves an implied
presence at the scene of the crime. A court may find that a person acted with another in a
42
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common purpose based upon that person’s active association in the execution of the common
purpose, whether or not there was a pre-existing plan.
Another principle relating to the liability of the person who “joins in” the offense of
another, is set forth in Motaung.45 Where the joiner assaults the victim after the victim has
sustained mortal injuries, but before he dies, the joiner can at most be convicted of attempted
murder. South African courts consider this rule important, because to hold otherwise would
amount to applying ex post facto liability -- that is, liability based on conduct performed after
the crucial mortal injury had been inflicted. Contrast this rule with the law in Scotland that
proceeds on the assumption that a person who joins in an assault after witnessing the degree
of violence which caused a victim’s death may be held to have accepted that degree of
violence and thus be guilty of murder. Note that where the Scottish court so ruled,46 it was
conceded that the defendant had been a party to a prior plan to assault, though not to kill, the
victim.
Aside from the “joiner” rule discussed above that covers a narrow range of cases,
the South African doctrine of common purpose can be applied to charges of culpable
homicide where the person charged is not the actual killer. When members of a group act
with a common purpose that results in a victim’s death, the intention of causing that death
is imputed to each member of the group, even where the common purpose concerned a
lesser crime. Note that certain offenses are excluded from the operation of the doctrine of
common purpose. These include offences that can be committed only through
instrumentality of the perpetrator’s own body, and not through that of another. Rape, or
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other sexual offences, would fall into this category, as would crimes such as perjury,
bigamy, and driving while intoxicated.47
The Crime of Conspiracy
As we have seen, the concept of “joint criminal enterprise” requires only knowledge
and acquiescence for a participant to be culpable; the mens rea involves intention, but
planning is not a necessary component of the crime. The crime of conspiracy shares many
components with the doctrines of “joint criminal enterprise,” “common purpose,” and “art
and part.” However, where those doctrines may or may not include a planning component,
conspiracy not only requires that a plan exist; the plan is the crime.
South Africa’s definition of “conspiracy” simply states that any person who
formulates agreement with another to commit a crime, or to aid or procure the commission
of a crime, is guilty of an offense separate from the actual crime. Thus, conspiracy can be
charged even where the crime conspired for did not take place. For the other doctrines
discussed, this is not the case. Moreover, in defining conspiracy, it is deemed unnecessary
to specify intention, since this is covered by the concept of agreement: one cannot come to
an agreement with another without intending to do so. In South Africa, a person is guilty
of conspiracy not only if he agrees to commit an offence as a perpetrator or co-perpetrator48
but also if he agrees to any level of conduct that would render him criminally liable as an
accomplice.49
Australia, where the doctrine of common purpose is similar to that of South
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Africa,50 has dealt with controversy over the crime of conspiracy. A subject of debate has
been whether there should be any crime of conspiracy for minor offenses.51 For conspiracy
to commit serious crimes, there is agreement that intention is required and that recklessness
will not suffice as the mens rea for the charge.52
In Scotland, where the accused have conspired together to bring about an objective
by criminal means, the normal course is simply to charge art and part guilt.53 Nevertheless,
conspiracy is still recognized as a major crime and is often charged in instances of group
crimes where there was a premeditated plan.54 Sometimes charges have been made for
conspiring to achieve an objective by criminal means, and alternatively with committing
the crime as a means of furthering the conspiracy.55 However, defendants cannot be
convicted of conspiring to bring about a crime and for being art and part in its commission,
since that would be to convict them twice for the same conduct under Scottish law. Neither
can a defendant be convicted of conspiracy for a crime of which he had been acquitted.56
The requisite mens rea includes simple foresight of the possible outcome; definite
knowledge is not necessary.57
A defendant can be convicted of a conspiracy formulated outside the country,58 a
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principle also supported by England.59 In both the above mentioned cases, no criminal acts
had been performed within the borders of the country exercising jurisdiction. Conspiracy
associated with terrorism or drug trafficking60 is especially likely to warrant severe
measures in all jurisdictions. New Zealand’s codified laws on conspiracy are in agreement
with the common law rulings on England.61
In the United States, as in South Africa, conspiracy can be prosecuted where the
intended crime did not take place. The U.S. legal system defines conspiracy as one of the
“inchoate crimes” that also include criminal “attempt.” In the U.S. it is common to convict
the defendant for both conspiring to bring about the crime and actually committing it.
Moreover, the seriousness of the crime is raised by an order of magnitude where conspiracy
is involved. In a recent case involving terrorism,62 the defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment for conspiring to use weapons of mass destruction, despite being acquitted of
murder and several other charges.
United States law considers conspiracy to be the most dangerous of the inchoate
crimes, more serious than any attempted crime. Even where the plan is thwarted before
any overt act occurs or any harm results, conspiracy is deemed extremely serious.63 This
attitude stems from the conviction that the dangerousness of a criminal mind is magnified
when acting in concert with like-minded cohorts. A single individual may lose his nerve
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and abandon plans to commit a crime; several criminals acting together are far less likely to
be deterred. There is great tension between this harsh assessment of conspiracy, a purely
mental and verbal deed, and the basic common law principle that a crime requires an
unlawful act. This tension has never been fully resolved in the case law of the United
States. However, harsh laws governing conspiracy remain in force, and have actually been
strengthened by legislation enacted in the wake of terrorist attacks.
In England, where there is still no criminal code,64 the law of conspiracy has
evolved over time from the era of Edward I. The seriousness of the crime can be inferred
from the severity with which courts deal with the charge. For example, although there is no
death penalty in England, the Privy Council recently upheld a death sentence in Jamaica
where the defendant was convicted of murder and conspiracy.65 Canada’s laws on
conspiracy are codified and are similar to those of the United States.66 It is worth noting
that international criminal law also recognizes conspiracy as a very serious crime. In two
recent cases before the European Court of Human Rights, conspiracy played a significant
role67 and was a major factor where the defendant did not prevail.68
Conspiracy is recognized as a crime under international law.69 This is a critical
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factor for dealing with the rogue state phenomenon, where national leaders conspire to
commit criminal acts beyond the reach of their national laws.70
The Doctrine of Felony Murder
Felony murder is a common law crime wherein the defendant is held culpable for
any death that results during commission of any of several designated felonies, including
arson and armed robbery. The crime has always been controversial given that it suspends
the requirement that a criminal act requires a culpable mental state. A defendant can be
found guilty of felony murder even where the resulting death was essentially accidental, so
long as the death came about as a result of the defendant’s felony crime. In the U.S., courts
have ruled that aiding and abetting a felony is not a sufficient underlying crime to warrant a
felony murder conviction.71 Another U.S. court has ruled that the death penalty is not an
appropriate sentence for an accomplice under the felony murder doctrine.72
A charge of felony murder cannot be brought where the underlying felony includes
the death of the victim. Australia recognizes felony murder in the areas still governed by
the common law.73
Art and Part Culpability
In Scotland, where the criminal law is still not codified, a basic principle of law
states that all persons who are concerned in the commission of a crime are equally guilty
and that each is responsible for the whole of the ultimate actus reus. The subordinate
nature of a particular participant is irrelevant to the question of his guilt, although it may
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influence his sentence. The legal term in Scottish law for group participation crimes is “art
and part.” The idea underlying analysis of art and part crimes is simple. Normally, a
person is responsible only for his own actions, but a group is responsible for the actions of
the group. The group is defined according to its common purpose. Therefore, each
member of the group defined by that purpose is responsible for what any of them does in
furtherance of the purpose.
The mens rea for art and part criminal activity is “intentionally.”74 Guilt under this
doctrine requires involvement in an actual crime for which each party to the crime is held
to be guilty.75 So, for example, if X is sent out to perform some unspecified job, he will be
guilty of whatever crime the job may constitute, provided it is within a range of activities
that could reasonably be expected of the group under the circumstances. It does not matter
if the crime in question differs from any ever before committed by the group so long as the
crime is within a range of activities reasonably expectable of the group. In Maxwell,76 the
example is given of a terrorist who guided the principal perpetrators of an attack to the
scene without knowing whether guns or explosives were to be used. In fact, explosives
were employed rendering the individual guilty, art and part, of possessing and using
explosives despite his ignorance that explosives were included in the plan. The defendant
in this example clearly intended the outcome (death and destruction). The precise means
employed to bring about the result is not an issue.
In Scotland, the culpable state of mind weighs more heavily than the precise
outcome. This principle leads to some odd results. The principle of art and part guilt
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applies even where it is impossible for an accused to have committed the crime as a
principal perpetrator. For example, a woman who assists a man to rape another woman
may be guilty, art and part, of rape. Contrast this aspect of art and part doctrine to the
South African rule77 the doctrine of common purpose, which states the doctrine cannot be
applied to offenses that can be committed only through instrumentality of the perpetrator’s
own body, and not through that of another. Art and part guilt can accrue in cases where the
person who was the instrument of the offense is held to be blameless. Thus, if X uses Y to
deliver an explosive device that kills Z, then X will be held guilty for the death of Z even if
Y is found to be innocent, due to lack of mens rea. “It is murder for A to employ a lunatic
or a child to kill B, or to employ a postman to deliver a bomb to him. A is also guilty where
he coerces B into committing the offence in circumstances [where an affirmative defense of
coercion is appropriate for B].”78
B.

AIDING AND ABETTING
As previously stated, the classic division of participants in felony under the

common law is between “principals and accessories,” with each of these being divided into
principals in the first and second degree and accessories before and after the fact. The
principal in the first degree is absolute perpetrator of the crime. The principal in the second
degree is the aider and abettor.
In the Rtaganda case79, before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), the accused was charged under Article 6(1) of the ICTY Statute80, which states
that:
77
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A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided abetted
in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4
of the present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime.
The wording of this Article is identical to that of Article 7(1) of the Statute for the ICTY.
Jurisprudence from the Yugoslav Tribunal has held that the concept of joint criminal
enterprise is implicit in the wording of the Article. In Rutanga, the court drew the
following inferences from the wording of the Article:
‘Planning’ of a crime implies one or more persons ‘designing the commission of a
crime at both its preparatory and execution phases…Incitement to commit an
offence…involves instigation another… to commit an offence. Instigation is
punishable only where it leads to the actual commission of an offence desired by
the instigator, except with genocide, where an accused may be held individually
criminally liable for incitement to commit genocide, even where such incitement
fails to produce a result.’81
The Court goes on to say that the word “ordering, which is the third form of participation,
implies a superior-subordinate relationship” between the person giving the order and the
one who carries it out. The superior is presumed to be using that position to persuade the
other to commit the offense. The fourth criterion, “commits,” is taken at face value. The
fifth and final criterion, “otherwise aiding and abetting” in one of the proscribed acts
contained in Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute, is described as follows:
[A]iding and abetting alone is sufficient to render the accused criminally liable.
In both instances, it is not necessary that the person aiding and abetting another to
commit an offence be present during the commission of the crime. The relevant
act of assistance may be geographically and temporally unconnected to the actual
[crime].82
The Court goes on to assert that aiding and abetting include all acts of assistance in any
form, including moral support. The only qualification to this sweeping statement is that the
assistance “must substantially contribute to the commission of the crime.” In U.S. law, the
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word “substantially” has been held to mean merely that there must be some evidence
supporting the allegation. This is considerably short of the standard of causation required
in common law criminal trials.
This doctrine of aiding and abetting as set forth by the ICTR is far more broad in its
implications than are the crimes of aiding and abetting under the common law. A second
degree principle (aider and abettor) in the common law is a person who is present, aiding and
abetting, the accomplishment of the crime. The “presence” required does not always mean
an actual immediate bodily presence at the crime scene. There may be a “constructive
presence” – for example, where one person commits a robbery and another keeps watch at a
distance. This other person would be culpable as a perpetrator in the second degree in the
robbery, although not physically present when the robbery occurred. Each element of the
crime for which the aider and abettor was charged must be proved.
The requisite mens rea for an accessory in Canada is that of knowledge.83 In Canada,
an aider and abettor coerced into a criminal action won a new trial on appeal.84 However, in
another case the defendant’s claim of duress was rejected on the grounds she was not in “fear
of death” during the criminal action.85 A criminal conviction for murder was remanded for a
new trial in Canada where the judge had erred by indicating that “slight” was an adequate
standard for causation to warrant a conviction on 2nd degree murder.86 Where an “agent” in a
drug trafficking case was acquitted, the prosecution was able to reinstate a conviction on
appeal.87 In the United States, the prosecution cannot appeal from an acquittal on criminal
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charges.
Accessory
The term “accessory” is employed in common law to cover those who “counsel or
procure” crime or “aid and abet” the perpetrator of a crime. Culpability is apportioned to the
accessory based on temporal factors. An accessory before the fact is one who participates is
planning and bringing about the crime, but is not present (physically or constructively) at the
crime scene. Note that if the person were present, even constructively present, at the crime,
he would be a perpetrator rather than an accessory. In Australia, an accessory before the fact
is a principle in the 1st degree.88 An accessory after the fact is one who, knowing that a
felony has occurred, assists the felon. The assistance rendered need not be criminal in itself.
For example, a person who knowingly assists a felon to leave town or hide out, is just as
much an accessory after the fact as one who helps to fence stolen goods. The mens rea
required for all accessory crimes is “knowingly” in jurisdictions recognizing that standard; in
Scotland, the mens rea is “intentionally.”
Attempts to use this framework of analysis in categorizing actual crimes give rise to
considerable confusion and disagreement. Modern statutes, such as the U.S. Model Penal
Code, have largely eliminated the significance of the discrete modes of criminal participation
defined in the common law. The old categories are subsumed into a two-prong analysis: 1)
an accessory after the fact is still generally subject to a lesser punishment, but 2) for the
remaining modes of complicity (second-degree perpetrator and accessory before the fact), the
punishment is that of a co-perpetrator.
As purely common law systems move toward codified statutory systems, the
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emerging attitude toward those who assist in committing a crime is to treat that individual
no differently than the one who actually commits the crime. Differences between the levels
of culpability would come into focus when punishment is meted out, rather than in
definition of the crime. An exception to this general rule is that a distinction is drawn
regarding those who provide assistance only after the crime is committed; these individuals
are generally held to be less culpable, since their actions, while possibly criminal, cannot be
said to have helped cause the crime. However, a Canadian court ruled that an accessory
after the fact may be tried where the principal is neither known nor located.89 This is
contrary to the standard common law doctrine.
Accomplice
In South Africa, there have been a number of important Appellate Division
decisions in recent years dealing with participation offences. An understanding of the
emergence of rules relating to participation offenses has been significantly simplified for
that jurisdiction as a result. In the Williams90 case, the Court drew the basic distinction
between perpetrators and accomplices.91 The principle is that a participant in crime is
guilty either as the perpetrator or as an accomplice, but not both.
A person may be deemed a perpetrator upon two grounds. The first is that his
conduct, including the circumstances surrounding the conduct and the culpability (mens
rea) with which it is carried out satisfies all the requirements for liability in the definition
of the offence.92 The circumstances of the conduct refers to what is meant by the term
“definition of the proscription,” often used in Commonwealth countries. A prohibition may
89
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be directed against a person meeting a particular description, such as a member of a certain
profession, or persons holding a certain citizenship. In such cases, persons lacking this
particular quality or status, who nevertheless further the offence by another who does have
the particular quality, would not be perpetrators but accomplices.93 The second ground94
upon which a person may be classified a perpetrator occurs where the conduct of another is
imputed to him by virtue of the principles relating to common purpose. Where there is
more than one perpetrator in the commission of an offence, all are considered coperpetrators, rather than accomplices.95
Accomplice liability in South African law, as in other common law jurisdictions, is
accessory in nature. No one can be held culpable as an accomplice unless another person
commits the offence as a perpetrator. Commentators distinguish between “minimal
accessoriness,” “limited accessoriness” and “strict accessoriness.” All these categories
require “the commission of an offence by somebody else.” Moreover, the conduct of the
other person must be unlawful and performed with culpability, as well as complying with the
definition of the relevant offence. The term accomplice is preferred to “accessory” or “aider
and abettor.”96 The definition is essentially conduct wherein a person intentionally furthers
the commission of an offense by another. Accessory after the fact is held to be less serious in
South Africa97 than other forms of accessoryship, as is true in the other jurisdictions under
consideration.
In South African law, an person can be charged as an accomplice for an act of
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omission, whereby he furthers the commission of an offence. In Williams, the court gives
the example of the night watchman who intentionally omits to sound the alarm because he
consciously allies himself with another who is breaking into a house. This is a variation on
the old common law doctrine of “duty” wherein a defendant can be charged for nonaction
where the person had a duty to act. Note that in South African law, it is not required that an
accomplice be acting in cooperation with the perpetrator.98 Furthermore, an accomplice
may be convicted of the offence where the perpetrator has not been convicted, or charged,
or where the identity of the perpetrator is unknown.99 In other common law jurisdictions,
an accomplice can only be charged in conjunction with a perpetrator.100
In the United States, federal law is statutory in its entirety. However, where federal
courts apply state law101, common law principles may be controlling if the state has enacted
legislation incorporating the common law, rather than adopting the Model Penal Code.
Under U.S. law, the consequences of aiding and abetting are very serious. The aider and
abettor is guilty, not of a lesser offense, but of the very offense committed by the actual
perpetrator, or principal, and subject to the same potential penalties.102 Thus, the question
of whether an participant in a crime is criminally liable as an aider and abettor, is of
paramount importance. The federal aiding and abetting doctrine applies to the entire
criminal code, so the issue arises whatever the federal crime in question. Moreover, once a
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principal commits a crime under federal law every other participant in the crime is subject
to the doctrine – regardless of the person’s level of involvement. For example, under U.S.
federal law the person who drives a terrorist to the airport is just as culpable as the one who
hijacks a plane and runs it into a building. Moreover, a friend sympathetic to the terrorists
who merely offers helpful advice on how to implement the plot is equally culpable.
Whether a conviction requires that the defendant “desired” the outcome (mens rea of
purposive), or merely have been “practically certain” of the outcome (mens rea of
knowing) will make the difference between conviction or acquittal of serious charges.
Where federal law is controlling, rulings on aiding and abetting provide no clear
answer regarding the requisite mens rea. The federal statute on aiding and abetting dates
back to 1909. Not only is the statute old, the controversy over “knowledge versus
purposeful intent” is almost as venerable. The Supreme Court first grappled with the issue
in 1870. For all the decades since, courts and legislatures have debated whether knowledge
or “true purpose” should be the required mens rea for accomplice liability. The commonly
held view is that the matter was settled in 1938, with the case of United States v. Peoni,103
where the court held that simple knowledge, absent desire, does not constitute adequate
mens rea for aiding and abetting. However, in actuality the rulings since that landmark
case have vacillated on the point. A 1949 Supreme Court ruling quotes Peoni with
approval.104 But in a 1961 case, the Court said that knowledge is indeed enough, if
accompanied by an act that substantially facilitates the commission of the underlying
offense.105 The Second Circuit in 1962 ruled that knowledge alone is enough usually,
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without providing further clarification.106 In another case in the same year the Second
Circuit ruled that a mens rea of “knowing” is adequate only where that is the requisite mens
rea for the underlying offense.107 The Seventh Circuit, in a 1985 case, implied that
knowledge alone is sometimes enough,108 and in 1995 suggested that knowledge is always
an adequate standard,109 then held the opposite in 1998.110 The Second Circuit has held
that the requisite mens rea is the same as the mens rea required for the principal in the
offence, whatever that might be.111 Different criminal statutes have contributed to the
confusion by requiring differing mens reas for the same crime in different jurisdictions. To
date, there has been no definitive Supreme Court ruling to settle the question.
Another issue where the case law is divided deals with whether aiding and abetting
requires specific intent. The Seventh Circuit has given contradictory rulings on the
question without any citation to the earlier ruling,112 or any indication of an intent to change
the law.113 Jurisprudence is especially confused where the underlying crime is one of
general intent, such as second-degree murder or assault. The 8th Circuit has ruled that the
crime of aiding and abetting always requires the additional mental element of specific
intent,114 but then equivocated about the meaning of specific intent.115 If aiding and
abetting is always a crime of specific intent, regardless of the mental state required for the
underlying crime, this creates a technical loophole. The aider and abettor could then claim
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voluntary intoxication as a defense although the principal has not such opportunity.116 The
result is a paradox: where the underlying crime is one of general intent, the aider and
abettor is held to a standard of specific intent allowing the aider and abettor to raise a
defense of diminished capacity where the principal cannot; but federal statute requires that
the aider and abettor be held to the same standard as the principal.117
Analysis of these issues is complicated by cases that introduce another category of
criminal participant, the causer.
The Causer
The act of aiding and abetting has a component that requires the act to have helped
cause the criminal outcome. However, the causer is conceptually distinct from the aider
and abettor and is governed by a different statutory subsection. While it may seem sensible
to say that the mens rea for a crime would be the same for the causer and the aider and
abettor, because the aiding and abetting doctrine requires a criminal principal in the crime,
the doctrine cannot apply to cases where the actual perpetrator is a duped or exploited
innocent. “In such a case, rather than being guilty of ‘aiding and abetting’ the innocent
principal, the defendant is guilty of ‘causing’ the innocent principal to commit the
offense.”118
Because the federal system of the United States leaves criminal law mostly to the
individual states, uniformity in this area is unlikely in the near future. The Supreme Court
is reluctant to attempt a definitive ruling on so broad an issue. The disagreement and
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confusion in regard to the crime of aiding and abetting is likely to continue in the United
States.
C.

INCITING CRIMES
Another cognate complicity crime to be considered is that of incitement. The

common law imposed liability upon any person who incites or solicits another to commit a
criminal offence. The inciter need not have initiated the suggestion that the subject crime
be committed – the idea for this may have come from the perpetrator himself. It is enough
that the defendant has encouraged the criminal action. Jurisdictions are in disagreement as
to whether the incitement merges into the crime that results.
The major points of difference between incitement and other forms of complicity
crimes, is that (like conspiracy) incitement is an offense per se. The person perpetrating
the act of incitement is liable as a principal offender. The accessory (is his capacity as an
accessory) become liable for the offence aided or counseled. Also, the offence in
contemplation need not have been committed for a person to become liable for the offence
of incitement; the converse is true where it is sought to make a person liable as an
accessory. Liability for the offence of incitement is established where the defendant
encourages another to commit a rime, even where the other had independently decided to
commit a crime.
Considerable disagreement among the common law jurisdictions exists on the subject
of incitement. In practice, other considerations unique to each society, impact the rules
regarding incitement. In the United States, the Supreme Court has ruled that constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation, except where such advocacy is directed to
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producing imminent lawless action.119 In theory this ruling would have far reaching
effects, since virtually any advocacy of violations of law might be expected to escape the
narrow limits defined. In practice, the ruling has had limited impact,120 though U.S.
constitutional law remains remarkably forgiving of speech deemed unacceptable in other
countries.121 An area where the law may become more strict in the U.S. involves hate
speech on the Internet. After vicious attacks on abortion providers, as well as other acts of
violence inspired by websites, some are calling for stricter laws against incitement using
this medium.122
The International Tribunal for Rwanda holds incitement to be a crime punishable
under Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute.123 Anyone familiar with the tragic events in that
jurisdiction can appreciate the need for this law.124 In the Ruggiu case,125 the defendant was
found guilty of the crime of incitement. The court noted that “at the time the Convention
on Genocide was adopted, the delegates agreed to expressly spell out direct and public
incitement to commit genocide as a speific crime, in particular, because of its critical role
in the planning of genocide.”126 Although the court granted clemency at sentencing, the
Trial Chamber stressed that “Mitigation of punishment in no way reduces the gravity of the
crime or the guilty verdict against a convicted person.
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Rwanda is confronted with a singular need to seek healing along with justice.
Various methods will be required to achieve this Herculean task.127 Other African
countries confront similar challenges.128
D.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the U.S. doctrine of aiding and abetting requires the additional label of

causor to support the same legal analysis that South Africa effects with the concept of
accomplice. The Scottish system uses “art and part” guilt as well as their version of aiding
and abetting to cover the same ground. England and Wales, along with Canada, uses a
version of aiding and abetting that requires the mens rea of the underlying crime, even
where the principal is innocent of the crime.
Joint criminal enterprise is a doctrine comprised of the same elements used in some
jurisdictions for the crimes of conspiracy or common purpose. The participation crime for
which the jurisdictions are in least agreement is that of incitement. But as events in
Rwanda have shown, this is possibly the most crucial of all the crimes of complicity, given
that so many other crimes derive from it.
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